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An Approach to Improving Judicial Review of 
the APA’s “Good Cause” Exception to Notice-
and-Comment Rulemaking 
KEVIN HARTNETT, JR.† 
INTRODUCTION 
Congress passed the Families First Coronavirus 
Response Act to ensure that workers suffering from COVID-
19 could use their paid sick leave.1 It charged the Secretary 
of Labor with administering the law by issuing necessary 
rules.2 Since the ordinary process for promulgating 
regulations under the Administrative Procedure Act 
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 1. Pub. L. No. 116-127, 134 Stat. 178 (2020).  
 2. See Paid Leave Under the Families First Coronavirus Response Act, 85 
Fed. Reg. 19,326 (Apr. 6, 2020).  
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(“APA”),3 the notice-and-comment procedure,4 can take 
months or even years to complete,5 Congress stipulated that 
 
 3. Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 5 U.S.C.). For a discussion of the history and purpose of the APA, see 
George B. Shepherd, Fierce Compromise: The Administrative Procedure Act 
Emerges from New Deal Politics, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1557, 1559 (1996). 
 4. See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)–(c) (2018). Notice-
and-comment is an informal rulemaking process that agencies must follow when 
issuing a rule, which consists of three steps. First, an agency looking to 
promulgate a binding rule must publish a notice of proposed rulemaking 
(“NPRM”) in the Federal Register at least thirty days before the rule’s effective 
date. § 553(b), (d). At this stage, the agency is merely proposing a rule which is 
not yet in effect. The notice must provide the time, place, and nature of public 
rulemaking proceedings; it must reference the legal authority under which the 
rule is proposed; and it must include either the terms or substance of the proposed 
rule or a description of the subjects and issues involved. § 553(b)(1)–(3). Second, 
after issuing the NPRM, the agency must give “interested persons” an 
opportunity to participate in the rulemaking by submitting “written data, views, 
or arguments.” § 553(c). In other words, the agency must allow those who might 
be particularly affected by the rule to comment on it and voice their concerns. 
Finally, after consideration of the public comments, the agency issues a final rule 
and accompanies it with a “concise general statement” of the rule’s basis and 
purpose. Id.  
This process also applies when an agency looks to amend or repeal a rule. 
§ 551(5). If an agency’s organic statute requires rulemaking to be “on the record 
after opportunity for an agency hearing,” then the APA’s formal rulemaking 
procedures located in sections 556 and 557 are required. § 553(c); see also United 
States v. Fla. E. Coast Ry. Co., 410 U.S. 224, 235 (1973) (holding that under 1966 
amendment to the Interstate Commerce Act, language of provision authorizing 
Commission to act “after hearing” was not equivalent of a requirement that a rule 
be made “on the record after opportunity for an agency hearing” so as to trigger 
stricter rulemaking proceedings under the APA). Other types of rulemaking 
include hybrid, direct-final, and negotiated. See TODD GARVEY & DANIEL T. 
SHEDD, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41546, A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF RULEMAKING AND 
JUDICIAL REVIEW 1 (2017). By far the most common form of rulemaking—and the 
focus of this Comment—is informal. See MAEVE P. CAREY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 
RL32240, THE FEDERAL RULEMAKING PROCESS: AN OVERVIEW 5 (2013) (“Informal 
rulemaking, also known as ‘notice and comment’ rulemaking, is used much more 
frequently.”). 
 5. Despite the widely recognized public benefits associated with notice-and-
comment, see, e.g., Dismas Charities, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 401 F.3d 666, 
680 (6th Cir. 2005) (explaining that public participation in informal rulemaking 
is meant to generate “the wisest rules” possible); Michael Asimow, Interim-Final 
Rules: Making Haste Slowly, 51 ADMIN. L. REV. 703, 707–08 (1999) (“Public input 
provides valuable information to rulemaking agencies at low cost to the agencies. 
Rules adopted with public participation are likely to be more effective and less 
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the circumstances fit within the APA’s “good cause” 
exception.6 Accordingly, the regulations implementing the 
law took effect the day they were published.  
The good cause exception allows an agency to bypass 
notice-and-comment,7 and the thirty-day publication 
requirement “when the agency for good cause finds (and 
incorporates the finding and a brief statement of reasons 
therefor in the rules issued) that notice and public procedure 
thereon are impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the 
 
costly to administer than rules written without such participation. They contain 
fewer mistakes. They are more likely to deal with unexpected and unique 
applications or exceptional situations.”); Ernest Gellhorn, Public Participation in 
Administrative Proceedings, 81 YALE L.J. 359, 369 (1972) (expressing the 
“axiomatic” need for public participation in a process that is so similar to the 
legislative process); Ellen R. Jordan, The Administrative Procedure Act’s “Good 
Cause” Exemption, 36 ADMIN. L. REV. 113, 116–17 (1984) (arguing that public 
participation in rulemaking makes the apparent lack of political accountability 
of agency administrators more palatable); Alan B. Morrison, The Administrative 
Procedure Act: A Living and Responsive Law, 72 VA. L. REV. 253, 255 (1986) 
(explaining that the informal rulemaking process promotes efficiency, fairness, 
and an overall “more rationally coherent rule”), it is also well known that notice-
and-comment can be quite burdensome, costly, and time-consuming. See Jordan, 
supra, at 118 (suggesting that in some situations the value of public participation 
may be outweighed by the need for efficiency); Thomas O. McGarity, Some 
Thoughts on “Deossifying” the Rulemaking Process, 41 DUKE L.J. 1385, 1397 
(1992) (asserting that subjects of progressive social regulation and their trade 
associations have “fiercely resisted the rulemaking process, seeking to lard it up 
with procedural, structural, and analytical trappings that have the predictable 
effect of slowing down the agency”); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Seven Ways to Deossify 
Agency Rulemaking, 47 ADMIN. L. REV. 59, 60 (1995) (noting various studies that 
bolster the complaints of administrative law scholars that agency rulemaking has 
become ossified). As a result, agencies often try to take advantage of exceptions 
to notice-and-comment when they are available.  
 6. Pub. L. No. 116-127, 134 Stat. 178, 190 (2020). Congressional intent to 
waive notice-and-comment is one of the few scenarios this Comment contends is 
worthy of the exception. See infra Part I.  
 7. An agency’s decision to invoke the APA’s good cause exception also 
relieves it of obligations outside of the APA. For example, when an agency 
promulgates a rule under the good cause exception it does not have to comply 
with the Regulatory Flexibility Act, which requires the agency to prepare impact 
statements of the rule on small business. Asimow, supra note 5, at 709. In 
addition, the agency does not have to perform the requirements of the Unfunded 
Mandates Reform Act, which requires the agency to provide cost-benefit analyses 
for certain significant regulatory actions. Id. at 709–10. 
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public interest.”8 The exception’s aim is to “strike a 
pragmatic compromise between the costs and delays 
inherent in complying” with informal rulemaking and “the 
public benefits that accrue from complying with those 
provisions.”9 To effectuate this balance, the legislative 
history of the APA provides that the exception should be 
narrowly construed and should not be used as an “escape 
clause.”10  
The good cause exception has become central to the 
notice-and-comment process,11 but federal courts have 
 
 8. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(B), (d) (2018). The APA 
enumerates three categories of exceptions to its informal rulemaking procedures, 
one of which is the good cause exception. A second cluster of rules are “wholly 
exempt” from the requirements of section 553. JARED P. COLE, CONG. RESEARCH 
SERV., R44356, THE GOOD CAUSE EXCEPTION TO NOTICE AND COMMENT 
RULEMAKING: JUDICIAL REVIEW OF AGENCY ACTION 1 (2016). This group is 
comprised of rules pertaining to (1) a military or foreign affairs function of the 
United States, (2) a matter relating to agency management or personnel, or (3) a 
matter relating to public property, loans, grants, benefits, or contracts. 
§ 553(a)(1)–(2). The final group contains “nonlegislative” rules, which are exempt 
from section 553(b) and (c)’s notice-and-comment requirements. “Nonlegislative” 
rules, as opposed to legislative or substantive rules, do not purport to carry the 
“force of law” and thus do not bind the public’s behavior. COLE, supra, at 2. These 
rules come in three flavors. First are rules concerning “agency organization, 
procedure, or practice.” § 553(b)(3)(A). The second type are “interpretative” rules. 
Id. Generally speaking, an interpretative rule merely clarifies existing 
obligations, it does not create new ones. Finally, section 553(b)(3)(A) also exempts 
“general statements of policy” from notice-and-comment procedures.  
 9. Asimow, supra note 5, at 707. 
 10. S. REP. No. 79–752, at 200 (1945) [hereinafter SENATE REPORT]. 
 11. In 2012, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) found that about 
35% of major rules and about 44% of nonmajor rules were issued without an 
NPRM between 2003 and 2010. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-13-
21, FEDERAL RULEMAKING: AGENCIES COULD TAKE ADDITIONAL STEPS TO RESPOND 
TO PUBLIC COMMENTS 8 (2012). Of the agency rules examined in the GAO’s 
sample, agencies invoked the good cause exception in 77% of major rules and 61% 
of nonmajor rules promulgated without an NPRM. Id. at 15. Major rules are those 
that the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs determines to, among other 
things, have or be likely to have an annual effect on the economy of $100 million 
or more. 5 U.S.C. § 804(2); see also Adrian Vermeule, Our Schmittian 
Administrative Law, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1095, 1125 (2009) (“It is hard to 
overemphasize the importance of the ‘good cause’ exception. Notice-and-comment 
rulemaking is central to modern administrative law and practice, and at the 
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struggled in cases where they review its use, leading to 
uncertainty and inconsistent outcomes.12 This uncertainty is 
especially problematic given the exception’s potential to 
undermine basic principles of representative democracy 
when abused.13 Many are already uneasy about the dangers 
of a growing administrative state.14 So to help settle at least 
one of those fears, it is critical that courts ensure the good 
cause exception is used only when absolutely necessary. 
 
center of the statutory procedures for notice-and-comment rulemaking is an 
open-ended override for emergency situations.”). 
 12. See Connor Raso, Agency Avoidance of Rulemaking Procedures, 67 ADMIN 
L. REV. 65, 87–90 (2015).  
 13. See James Yates, Comment, “Good Cause” is Cause for Concern, 86 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 1438, 1463 (2018) (“The increased use of the good cause exception 
has far-reaching effects. The exception undermines our democratic system 
because it permits agencies to issue rules without public participation. Previous 
presidents have used this mechanism to promulgate rules, none with more 
success than Obama. Now Trump is using it to try to unravel the rules Obama 
implemented before leaving office. This game of administrative ping pong 
threatens the legitimacy of our administrative state. It allows agencies to 
regulate without public participation and encourages abuse during 
administration changes.”); Nathanael Paynter, Comment, Flexibility and Public 
Participation: Refining the Administrative Procedure Act’s Good Cause Exception, 
2011 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 397, 399 (2011) (“[I]n order to limit the power given to 
agencies acting in a quasi-legislative capacity, and to protect basic principles of 
representative democracy in rulemaking, changes to the good cause exception are 
necessary.”). 
 14.  See, e.g., City of Arlington, Tex. v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290, 313 (2013) (Roberts, 
J., dissenting) (“The Framers could hardly have envisioned today’s ‘vast and 
varied federal bureaucracy’ and the authority administrative agencies now hold 
over our economic, social, and political activities. Ibid. ‘[T]he administrative state 
with its reams of regulations would leave them rubbing their eyes.’” (quoting 
Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 807 (1999) (Souter, J., dissenting))). The 
constitutional infirmity of the administrative state, however, is only ostensible. 
Analyzed with care, constitutional text, structure, and history can be synthesized 
to provide support for the administrative state. See Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. 
Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 64–65 
(1994) (interpreting James Madison’s suggestion to the Committee of the Whole 
that executive power includes powers “not Legislative nor Judiciary” as referring 
to “administrative” power); Garrett West, Note, Congressional Power Over Office 
Creation, 128 YALE L.J. 166, 177 (2018) (arguing that the Necessary and Proper 
Clause and the Appointments Clause, read together, grant Congress the 
authority to create executive-branch offices). 
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 One of the reasons for the confusion is substantive. 
Courts struggle in their attempt to identify the types of 
circumstances that warrant use of the exception. This is 
mainly due to the vagueness in the statutory language.15 So 
to balance the need for public participation in agency 
rulemaking with the desire for administrative efficiency in 
that process, courts should ensure that only compelling, 
clearly circumscribed situations qualify for the exception. 
This Comment argues, as others have, that those 
circumstances are (1) where prior notice would subvert the 
underlying statutory scheme; (2) where Congress intends to 
waive notice-and-comment; and (3) emergencies.16 
Another cause for confusion involves a circuit split over 
the proper standard for reviewing an agency’s use of the 
exception.17 Some review the action de novo,18 others for 
arbitrary and capriciousness.19 This Comment argues that 
neither is sufficient, since either approach treats an agency’s 
good cause determination as a one-dimensional action rather 
than the multifaceted decision that it is. In other words, 
applying arbitrary and capricious review, on its own, to an 
agency’s decision to use good cause affords deference to 
agencies in areas where it is not due—namely to legal 
conclusions—and applying only de novo review withholds 
deference in areas where the agency should receive it—
namely to factual determinations.20 Accordingly, this 
 
 15. See James Kim, Note, For a Good Cause: Reforming the Good Cause 
Exception to Notice and Comment Rulemaking Under the Administrative 
Procedure Act, 18 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1045, 1070–71 (2011). 
 16. See generally id. 
 17. This Comment focuses on “administrative law in the trenches—in the 
federal courts of appeal,” which is “the terrain in which administrative law 
actually operates.” Vermeule, supra note 11, at 1097. 
 18. See infra note 106 and accompanying text. 
 19. See infra note 108 and accompanying text. 
 20. Cf. Louis J. Virelli III, Deconstructing Arbitrary and Capricious Review, 
92 N.C.L.R. 721, 724 (2014) (rejecting a “one-dimensional” approach that treats 
arbitrary and capricious review as a unitary concept—“as applying the same 
standard in the same way across all manner of agency conduct”—and instead 
2020] THE APA’S “GOOD CAUSE” EXCEPTION 1567 
Comment argues for a two-step analysis, where the standard 
of review at step one is “arbitrary and capricious,” and the 
standard at step two is de novo. At least one court and one 
commentator advocate advocate for such a review, calling it 
the “mixed” standard.21  These approaches to improving 
judicial review of the good cause exception are consistent 
with the spirit and the text of the APA;22 they better embrace 
the “complexity and multidimensional nature” of agency 
rulemaking;23 and they further the purpose of the narrowly-
prescribed good cause exception. Just as importantly, they 
will ensure consistency in courts’ examination of the 
exception as contemplated by the APA.  
The remaining Parts of this Comment proceed as follows: 
Part I aims to help courts identify, in the first instance, 
precisely what circumstances are so compelling as to merit 
the use of the exception, arguing that the vagueness of the 
statutory language contributes to this difficult task.24 To do 
 
arguing that arbitrary and capricious review should divide administrative 
decisions into their constituent parts).  
 21. See United States v. Reynolds, 710 F.3d 498, 509 (3d Cir. 2013); Kelli M. 
Golinghorst, Note, Meet Me in the Middle: The Search for the Appropriate 
Standard of Review for the APA’s Good Cause Exception, 103 IOWA L. REV. 1277, 
1300 (2018). This Comment employs the terms “mixed,” “bifurcated,” and “two-
step analysis” interchangeably to mean the same thing—a standard of review 
that applies one standard to factual determinations and another to legal 
conclusions. 
 22. See Reynolds, 710 F.3d at 509 (arguing that the “mixed” standard “is 
consistent with the text of § 706” because that section “includes no requirement 
that only one provision of the section be applied to a particular review” which 
enables courts “to apply one standard to legal determinations and another to 
factual determinations made in an administrative decision”). 
 23. Virelli, supra note 20, at 727. 
 24. See Vermeule, supra note 11, at 1123 (“But what exactly are the ‘terms’ 
that the agency must obey? The APA’s text is largely vacuous on this point; ‘good 
cause’ is an open-ended standard that essentially delegates the issue to future 
decisions of agencies and judges.”). Another problem is, of course, politics. At least 
for politically contentious or economically significant rules, judges of different 
affiliations might choose to uphold a particular rule despite a dubious good cause 
claim or strike it down notwithstanding a strong one. Cf. Yates, supra note 13, at 
1449–50 (2018). Analyzing this political element is, however, beyond the scope of 
this Comment.  
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so, Part I collects a number of federal decisions that have 
dealt with an agency’s use of good cause in compelling 
circumstances and files them according to their respective 
fact patterns. This Part argues that only these compelling 
fact patterns warrant dispensing with notice-and-comment. 
Part II discusses the circuit split over the standard of review 
of the good cause exception, describing the “mixed” standard 
as it was discussed by the Third Circuit in Reynolds in its 
analysis of a prior decision, Philadelphia Citizens in Action 
v. Schweiker.25 Then, Part II argues that the “mixed” 
standard is correct and offers some justifications for it. In 
doing so, Part II addresses a fundamental disagreement 
driving the circuit split that this Comment contends has not 
been sufficiently explored: whether to classify good cause as 
a “legal conclusion” or a “discretionary decision.”26 To answer 
this question, Part II argues first that good cause actually 
consists of two distinct parts or steps: (1) the agency’s factual 
findings supporting its decision to invoke good cause; and (2) 
the ultimate conclusion that these findings are so compelling 
as to rise to the level of rendering prior notice-and-comment 
“impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public 
interest.”27 The issue is how to classify the second step. Part 
II ultimately concludes that such action is a legal conclusion 
subject to de novo review. Finally, Part III argues that the 
mixed standard is not an outlier despite the Reynolds court 
referring to it as one.28 Specifically, as a practical matter, 
other circuits have applied some form of mixed review, 
whether or not they declared that they were applying such 
review. 
 
 25. 669 F.2d 877 (3d Cir. 1982). 
 26. See COLE, supra note 8, at 13. 
 27. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(B) (2018); cf. Babette E. L. Boliek, Agencies in Crisis? An 
Examination of State and Federal Agency Emergency Powers, 81 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 3339, 3363 (2013). 
 28. Cf. COLE, supra note 8, at 14 n.129 (“It is unclear whether other courts 
that apply de novo review to agency good cause determinations would recognize 
[the mixed standard] as distinct.”). 
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I. WHAT CONSTITUTES “GOOD CAUSE”? 
Before discussing the standard of review, this Part aims 
to help courts identify precisely what circumstances are 
sufficiently compelling so as to merit the use of the good 
cause exception. This substantive difficulty compounds the 
problems associated with the circuit split over the standard 
of review29 and can be attributed to the vagueness of the 
statutory language itself.30 The exception’s language is 
skeletal; it only limits good cause to broad, open-ended 
situations where prior notice-and-comment would be 
“impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public 
interest.”31 According to the Senate Judiciary Committee: 
“Impracticable” means a situation in which the due and required 
execution of the agency functions would be unavoidably prevented 
by its undertaking public rule-making proceedings. “Unnecessary” 
means unnecessary so far as the public is concerned, as would be 
the case if a minor or merely technical amendment in which the 
public is not particularly interested were involved. “Public interest” 
supplements the terms “impracticable” or “unnecessary”; it requires 
that public rule-making procedures shall not prevent an agency 
from operating and that, on the other hand, lack of public interest 
in rule making warrants an agency to dispense with public 
procedure.32 
The Attorney General’s APA manual also endorsed these 
interpretations.33 But although the language purports to 
suggest separate categories, agencies and courts have not 
treated them as distinct.34 In particular, “impracticable” and 
 
 29. See COLE, supra note 8, at 4; Raso, supra note 12, at 113 (“[E]ven the most 
diligent courts may struggle to treat each of the many different combinations of 
case facts consistently.”). 
 30. Kim, supra note 15, at 1071; see also Vermeule, supra note 11, at 1123 
(“The APA’s text is largely vacuous[;] . . . ‘good cause is an open-ended standard 
that essentially delegates the issue to future decisions of agencies and judges.”). 
 31. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(B).  
 32. SENATE REPORT, supra note 10, at 200. 
 33. Yates, supra note 13, at 1443 (citing U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY 
GENERAL’S MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT 30–31 (1947)). 
 34. See Juan J. Lavilla, The Good Cause Exemption to Notice and Comment 
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“contrary to the public interest” often cover the same 
situations.35 This overlap permits too much discretion and 
leads to judicial disagreements over precisely what 
circumstances rise to the level of good cause, all other things 
being equal. 
One way to cabin agency discretion is to create a more 
pronounced, fact-based separation between these categories. 
To do so, it is helpful to explore the various types of fact 
scenarios that courts have deemed sufficient to justify 
dispensing with notice-and-comment. Accordingly, this Part 
files these cases into three distinct contexts: (1) where prior 
notice would subvert the underlying statutory scheme; (2) 
where Congress intends to waive notice-and-comment; and 
(3) emergencies.36 Each is reviewed below.  
A. Where Prior Notice Would Undermine the Statutory 
Scheme 
One frequent context where courts have upheld an 
agency’s decision to invoke good cause is where the claim was 
that prior notice would frustrate the underlying statutory 
scheme.37 Deciding whether the exception is warranted in 
these cases requires courts to examine the “nature” of the 
interests that could be harmed by prior notice and weigh 
them against the preference for public participation.38 Such 
a situation frequently arises in areas of economic 
regulation.39 A famous example occurred in Mobil Oil Corp. 
v. Department of Energy.40 In that case, the Federal Energy 
 
Rulemaking Requirements Under the Administrative Procedure Act, 3 ADMIN. L.J. 
317, 351 (1989) (noting the “formalistic” approach to the good cause exemption is 
not followed in administrative practice or by courts (internal quotation marks 
omitted)); Kim, supra note 15, at 1050. 
 35. See Jordan, supra note 5, at 118–19; Kim, supra note 15, at 1050. 
 36. COLE, supra note 8, at 4–5; see also Kim, supra note 15, at 1053. 
 37. COLE, supra note 8, at 8; Kim, supra note 15, at 1055. 
 38. See Lavilla, supra note 34, at 381; Kim, supra note 15, at 1055.  
 39. Lavilla, supra note 34, at 381; Kim, supra note 15, at 1055. 
 40. 728 F.2d 1477 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1983). 
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Administration (“FEA”) invoked the good cause exception 
when it issued an interim-final rule (“IFR”) that regulated oil 
price controls.41 The new rule sought to clarify a loophole in 
existing regulations that oil sellers were taking advantage of 
to avoid FEA regulations.42 In support of its decision to 
uphold the FEA’s decision to invoke good cause, the 
Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals reasoned that if the 
FEA were to disclose the rule for notice-and-comment, oil 
sellers would then become aware of the ambiguity in the law 
and distort the market—a problem that the price control 
regulation sought to remedy.43 
A similar case is DeRieux v. Five Smiths, Inc.44 There, 
the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970 imposed a freeze on 
season ticket pricing to professional football games.45 
President Nixon issued an executive order pursuant to the 
Act, and the ensuing regulations implementing the price 
controls were promulgated without notice-and-comment 
 
 41. Id. at 1482. In addition to bypassing notice-and-comment, the agency also 
does not have to wait thirty days for the rule to become effective. 5 U.S.C. § 553(d) 
(2018). This advantage is described as “interim rulemaking.” See generally 
Asimow, supra note 5. An “interim-final” rule is thus a rule adopted by an agency 
that becomes immediately effective without pre-promulgation notice-and-
comment. Such rules are sometimes referred to as “temporary” rules or “final 
rules; comments requested.” But the term “interim-final” is used most often, and 
so it will be used here. Id. at 705 n.7. A clumsier sounding (but still quite apt) 
term is “final-final” rule, which refers to the rule that supplants an interim-final 
rule in light of post-promulgation comments. Id. at 705. Normally, when an 
agency decides to issue an interim-final rule, the adopting agency will declare 
that it will consider post-effective public comments, will modify the rule in light 
of those comments, and will then adopt a final-final rule. Id. at 704. However, the 
agency is not legally required to do so. Unless a statute provides otherwise, an 
agency’s duty under § 553 is completely discharged after adopting a rule under 
the good cause exception (or any other APA exception). See id. at 711. Solicitation 
of post-promulgation comments, consideration of such comments, preparation of 
a statement of basis and purpose, and modification of the interim-final rule in 
light of the comments are all actions that an agency assumes voluntarily. Id.   
 42. Id.  
 43. Id. at 1490–92.  
 44. 499 F.2d 1321 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1974). 
 45. Id. at 1326.  
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under the good cause exception.46 The Temporary 
Emergency Court of Appeals upheld the use of the exception, 
reasoning that advance notice of the price freeze would have 
caused a massive effort to raise prices before the freeze 
deadline.47 This, the court said, would lead to greater price 
inflation, which was precisely the problem that the price 
controls intended to address.48  
More recently, a district court judge in Washington, 
D.C., vacated an IFR promulgated jointly by the 
Departments of Justice and Homeland Security (the 
“Departments”). The IFR required migrants to seek 
protections from each country they traveled through on their 
way to the southern border before they could petition for 
asylum.49 The Departments argued that good cause was 
warranted because making the rule available for comment 
before it became final could lead to a surge of asylum seekers 
at the border, since they would ostensibly rush to file a 
petition before the rule went into effect and restricted their 
rights.50 They also argued that their “experience has been 
that when public announcements are made regarding 
changes in our immigration laws and procedures, there are 
dramatic increases in the numbers of aliens who enter or 
attempt to enter the United States along the southern 
border.”51 This, the Departments claimed, “would be 
destabilizing and would jeopardize the lives and welfare of 
aliens who could surge to the border to enter the United 
 
 46. Id. at 1331. 
 47. Id. at 1332–33. 
 48. Id.  
 49. See Asylum Eligibility and Procedural Modifications, 84 Fed. Reg. 33,829, 
33,829–30 (July 16, 2019); see also Capital Area Immigrants’ Rights Coal. v. 
Trump, No. 19-2530, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 114421, at *6 (D.D.C. June 30, 2020). 
 50. Capital Area Immigrants’ Rights Coal., 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 114421, at 
*14. 
 51. Asylum Eligibility and Procedural Modifications, 84 Fed. Reg. at 33,841; 
see also Capital Area Immigrants’ Rights Coal., 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 114421, 
at *40.  
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States before the rule took effect.”52 The District Court was 
not persuaded, holding that the record did “not contain 
sufficient evidence” that this surge would occur while 
criticizing the Departments for relying heavily on a two-year-
old article from the Washington Post in making their 
argument.53  
B. Where Congress Intends to Waive Notice-and-Comment 
An agency’s decision to invoke good cause and bypass 
notice-and-comment might also be justified by congressional 
intent.54 In such a case, Congress has either explicitly or 
implicitly required the agency to promulgate the rule in 
question immediately.55 Courts have generally accepted an 
agency’s use of good cause where meeting a statutory 
deadline makes it impracticable to engage in pre-
promulgation notice-and-comment.56 For example, in Asiana 
 
 52. Asylum Eligibility and Procedural Modifications, 84 Fed. Reg. at 33,841; 
see also Capital Area Immigrants’ Rights Coal., 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 114421, 
at *40. 
 53. Capital Area Immigrants’ Rights Coal., 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 114421, at 
*41. The court continued: 
Even assuming that the rule was likely to have had a similar effect as 
the regulatory change described in the article, the article contains no 
evidence that that change caused a surge of asylum seekers at the 
border—let alone one on a scale and at a speed that would have 
jeopardized their lives or otherwise have defeated the purpose of the rule 
if notice-and-comment rulemaking had proceeded . . . . In fact, the article 
lacks any data suggesting that the number of asylum seekers increased 
at all during this time—only that more asylum seekers brought children 
with them. 
Id. at *42; see also Jacqueline Thomsen, ‘Failure Is Striking’: Trump-Tapped 
Judge Throws Out Administration’s Asylum Restriction, LAW.COM (July 01,  
2020, 8:37 AM), https://www.law.com/nationallawjournal/2020/07/01/failure-is-
striking-trump-tapped-judge-throws-out-administrations-asylum-restriction/. 
 54. Lavilla, supra note 34, at 353–54. 
 55. See Kim, supra note 15. 
 56. See Methodist Hosp. of Sacramento v. Shalala, 38 F.3d 1225, 1236–38 
(D.C. Cir. 1994) (holding that good cause allowed Secretary of Health and Human 
Services to promulgate regulations modifying method for reimbursing Medicare 
providers where Congress had set a five-month time table from date of enactment 
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Airlines v. Federal Aviation Administration (“FAA”),57 the 
FAA, pursuant to the Federal Aviation Administration 
Reauthorization Act, issued an IFR without notice-and-
comment, allowing it to collect $100 million in overflight 
fees.58 The FAA cited an express statutory deadline as cause 
for bypassing notice-and-comment, although the agency did 
allow post-promulgation opportunity to comment before 
issuing a final-final rule.59 In upholding the agency’s IFR, the 
court noted that an express statutory deadline, without 
more, is insufficient to justify the use of the good cause 
exception.60 But where a deadline is coupled with 
congressional intent to waive notice-and-comment, as was 
the case here, good cause is justified.61 
In some cases, however, Congress might express an 
intent to waive notice-and-comment without establishing a 
statutory deadline.62 In such circumstances, courts must 
decide whether Congress’s general policy in favor of public 
participation is outweighed by its intent to expedite an 
agency’s promulgation of a rule.63 For instance, in Sepulveda 
v. Block,64 the Secretary of Agriculture issued an IFR 
revising the food stamp statute.65 In upholding the 
secretary’s decision, the Second Circuit cited a Senate report 
that reflected Congress’s discontent with the slow 
 
of statute to date new procedures were to go into effect and changes were 
exceedingly complex); see also Lavilla, supra note 34, at 354. But see U.S. Steel 
Corp. v. EPA, 595 F.2d 207, 213 (5th Cir. 1979) (holding that the “mere existence” 
of a deadline, without more, is usually insufficient to establish good cause). 
 57. 134 F.3d 393 (D.C. Cir. 1998). 
 58. Id. at 395. 
 59. Id.  
 60. Id. at 398–99.  
 61. See id. at 398.  
 62. See Lavilla, supra note 34, at 356; Kim, supra note 15, at 1058. 
 63. Kim, supra note 15, at 1058.  
 64. 782 F.2d 363 (2d Cir. 1986). 
 65. Id. at 364. 
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implementation of the provisions enacted the year prior.66 
Contrast that case with Levesque v. Block,67 where the 
First Circuit rejected an IFR promulgated without notice-
and-comment despite evidence of Congress’s intent that the 
rule be issued expeditiously.68 That case involved the 
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, which 
authorized the Secretary of Agriculture to give effect to the 
act according to his sole discretion, qualified only by the need 
for “orderly implementation.”69 The court essentially held 
that “orderly” did not mean “immediate,” in this case, and so 
it was inappropriate for the secretary to dispense with 
notice-and-comment.70 
More recently is New York v. United States Department 
of Labor.71 On April 1, 2020, the Department of Labor 
(“DOL”) issued a Final Rule implementing the provisions of 
the Families First Coronavirus Response Act (“FFCRA”), a 
statute passed by Congress in response to the COVID-19 
pandemic’s life-altering impacts on American workers.72 The 
Final Rule was promulgated without notice-and-comment 
pursuant to the DOL’s statutory authority to “issue 
regulations for good cause under sections 553(b)(B) and 
553(d)(A) . . . as necessary, to carry out the purposes of this 
Act.”73 As reasons for its decision to invoke this authority, 
the agency explained:  
The COVID-19 pandemic has escalated at a rapid pace and scale, 
leaving American families with difficult choices in balancing work, 
child care, and the need to seek medical attention for illness caused 
by the virus. To avoid economic harm to American families facing 
 
 66. Id. at 366. 
 67. 723 F.2d 175 (1st Cir. 1983).  
 68. Id. at 184.  
 69. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 70. Id. at 184–85. 
 71. No. 20-CV-3020, 2020 WL 4462260 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 3, 2020). 
 72. Pub. L. No. 116-127, 134 Stat. 178 (2020). 
 73. Id. at 190. 
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these conditions, a decision to undertake notice-and-comment 
rulemaking would likely delay final action on this matter by weeks 
or months, and would, therefore, complicate and likely preclude the 
Department from successfully exercising the authority created 
[under FFCRA]. Moreover, such delay would be counter to one of 
the FFCRA’s main purposes in establishing paid leave: enabling 
employees to leave the workplace now to help prevent the spread of 
COVID-19.74 
The agency’s decision to forego notice-and-comment was 
not challenged, however.75 This is because congressional 
authorization to invoke good cause was baked into FFCRA 
itself.76  
C. Emergencies 
Far and away the most relevant scenario in a world 
shaped by a pandemic is a good cause claim on the basis of 
an emergency.77 Courts have generally upheld an agency’s 
decision to invoke good cause and bypass notice-and-
comment where there was some compelling exigency.78 
 
 74. Paid Leave Under the Families First Coronavirus Response Act, 85 Fed. 
Reg. 19,326, 19,342 (Apr. 6, 2020). 
 75. See generally New York, 2020 WL 4462260. 
 76. Even though the court ultimately severed the offending provisions from 
the DOL’s Final Rule for substantive reasons, id. at *13, a procedural challenge 
to the agency’s decision to invoke good cause would likely not have been 
successful, even if Congress had not explicitly authorized it. To be sure, the DOL’s 
rule offered little in substance to protect American families from economic harm 
resulting from COVID-19. We might even say that the rule invited harm by 
excluding certain employees from receiving paid leave. But the question is more 
procedural. The question is whether a delay in promulgating the rule would have 
resulted in imminent harm, not whether the rule itself results in harm. In this 
case it would have. A delay in promulgating something would have visited serious 
consequences on the American workers who needed to know how FFCRA would 
be administered in order to plan their departure from the workplace and prevent 
the spread of the disease. So, in essence, the DOL was permitted to issue an 
immediately effective rule given its circumstances, just not a bad one. 
 77. Cf. Vermeule, supra note 11, at 1123 (“[E]xceptions to [notice-and-
comment] are a critical testing ground for the administrative law of 
emergencies.”). 
 78. Kim, supra note 15, at 1053. 
2020] THE APA’S “GOOD CAUSE” EXCEPTION 1577 
However, this is a high bar.79 Courts generally require that 
the situation be so compelling as to pose an immediate threat 
to public health, safety, or welfare.80 To determine whether 
a situation is so sufficiently grave as to merit a finding of 
good cause, courts examine the “nature” of the interest that 
is threatened, and decide whether that situation warrants a 
departure from notice-and-comment.81 Ultimately, the 
analysis tends to be highly contextual and fact intensive.82  
Imminent threats to human life and physical security 
normally constitute a grave enough situation to justify use of 
the good cause exception.83 In Hawaii Helicopter Operators 
Ass’n v. Federal Aviation Administration,84 the FAA 
bypassed notice-and-comment in promulgating new air-
safety rules after a series of helicopter air-tour accidents.85 
The FAA cited as justification for its decision an urgent 
threat to public safety, including the fact that there were 
twenty air-tour accidents and twenty-four fatalities within 
the last three years.86 The court held that the FAA’s finding 
of good cause was valid, pointing out that no motive other 
than public safety was conceivable for waiving notice-and-
comment.87  
However, the evidence of an immediate threat to human 
 
 79. See id. (“Courts, however, have not upheld good cause findings in every 
instance where an agency faces an urgent situation, as that would encourage the 
agency to use the good cause exception as an ‘escape clause’ . . . .” (citing Layne 
M. Campbell, Comment, Agency Discretion to Accept Comment in Informal 
Rulemaking: What Constitutes “Good Cause” Under the Administrative Procedure 
Act, 1980 BYU L. REV. 93, 96 (1980))). 
 80. Id. (citations omitted). 
 81. See Lavilla, supra note 34, at 363. 
 82. See id.  
 83. Kim, supra note 15, at 1054. 
 84. 51 F.3d 212 (9th Cir. 1995). 
 85. Id. at 214. 
 86. Id.  
 87. Id. at 214–15. 
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life must be compelling.88 In Texas Food Industry Ass’n v. 
United States Department of Agriculture,89 the Department 
of Agriculture (“DOA”) imposed a new labeling requirement 
for uncooked and partially cooked meat and poultry products 
without notice-and-comment.90 As justification, the DOA 
cited a public health emergency stemming from E. coli 
contamination and continuing instances of undercooked 
hamburgers.91 The court rejected the DOA’s finding of good 
cause, reasoning that the E. coli outbreak was geographically 
isolated and was the result of negligence of fast food chains.92 
The protection of the economic health of the country as a 
whole might also merit a finding of good cause.93 In Reeves v. 
Simon,94 the Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals held 
that the Federal Energy Office (“FEO”) was able to bypass 
notice-and-comment when it issued a rule prohibiting gas-
station operators from reserving their available fuel for 
regular customers.95 In doing so, the court explained that 
good cause was justified by a national emergency resulting 
from violence at gas stations due to fuel shortages.96  
Finally, in Jifry v. Federal Aviation Administration,97 
the FAA in conjunction with the Transportation Security 
Administration (“TSA”) published new rules governing the 
 
 88. Kim, supra note 15, at 1054; see also Hedge v. Lyng, 689 F. Supp. 884, 893 
(D. Minn. 1987) (holding that Secretary of Agriculture’s concern about possible 
disruption of his existing calendar if regulations governing election of FmHA 
county committee members were not expeditiously adopted did not rise to level 
of an “emergency,” such as would constitute good cause).  
 89. 842 F. Supp. 254 (W.D. Tex. 1993).  
 90. Id. at 256–57.  
 91. Id. at 257.  
 92. Id. at 260.  
 93. Kim, supra note 15, at 1055. 
 94. 507 F.2d 455 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1974). 
 95. Id. at 457–58. 
 96. Id. at 459. These events took place during the 1973 Oil Crisis. 
 97. 370 F.3d 1174 (D.C. Cir. 2004). 
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revocation of airman certificates if a pilot was found to be a 
security risk in the wake of 9/11.98 The agency reasoned that 
prior notice-and-comment “could delay the ability of TSA and 
the FAA to take effective action to keep persons found by 
TSA to pose a security threat from holding an airman 
certificate,” and that dispensing with the process was 
“necessary to prevent a possible imminent hazard to aircraft, 
persons, and property within the United States.”99  
Two pilots challenged these rules, arguing that they 
lacked a “rational basis” because the FAA already had the 
statutory authority to do what the rules prescribed, and 
therefore notice-and-comment was not “impracticable, 
unnecessary or contrary to the public interest.”100 The D.C. 
Circuit found that Congress only gave the FAA permissive 
authority and that the rules mandated the process by which 
an individual’s pilot certificate would automatically be 
revoked if the TSA notified the FAA that a pilot posed a 
security risk.101 The court ultimately held that the agencies’ 
“legitimate concern over the threat of further terrorist acts 
involving aircraft in the aftermath of September 11, 2001,” 
was enough to constitute good cause.102  
As these cases show, courts have generally upheld an 
agency’s use of good cause where (1) delay would frustrate 
the purpose of a legislative objective; (2) Congress intended 
to waive notice-and-comment; or (3) there was an 
emergency.103 To balance the need for public participation in 
rulemaking with the desire for efficiency in that process, 
courts should ensure that only these compelling situations 
qualify for the exception.104  
 
 98. Id. at 1176–77. 
 99. Id. at 1179 (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 100. Id. at 1178.  
 101. Id. at 1179. 
 102. Id. at 1179–80.  
 103. See Kim, supra note 15, at 1054–58.  
 104. For a discussion of the various legislative attempts to reform the exception 
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II. THE CASE FOR THE “MIXED” STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Identifying precisely what circumstances warrant a 
finding of good cause is only half of the battle, however. 
There is still the procedural confusion over the appropriate 
standard of review to apply to an agency’s decision that good 
cause exists.105 Some courts say the action should be 
 
and an argument that Congress should amend the language to reflect only these 
narrow circumstances, see generally id. This Comment focuses on what courts 
can do now to better handle the exception without having to wait for legislative 
reform.  
 105. Because de novo review is a much more “exacting” standard than the 
deferential posture of arbitrary and capricious review, COLE, supra note 8, at 13–
14, the selection of a standard should be vital to the outcome. It appears that it 
hasn’t been in many cases. Take for example the circuits’ review of the attorney 
general’s IFR applying SORNA retroactively. In that context, the Fourth and 
Sixth Circuits reviewed the attorney general’s decision to invoke the exception de 
novo. In contrast, the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits reviewed for arbitrary and 
capriciousness. However, the results in these cases do not seem to follow from the 
chosen standards of review. For instance, the Fourth and Sixth circuits both 
applied de novo review, but reached opposite outcomes. Similarly, the Fifth and 
Eleventh circuits went in different directions but under the arbitrary and 
capricious standard. Some might say that this incongruence suggests, as courts 
and scholars have argued, that the standard of review does not matter. See, e.g., 
Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 163 (1999) (“[W]e have failed to uncover a single 
instance in which a reviewing court conceded that the use of one standard rather 
than the other would in fact have produced a different outcome.”); Ernest 
Gellhorn & Glen O. Robinson, Perspectives on Administrative Law, 75 COLUM. L. 
REV. 771, 780 (1975) (famously stating that in the context of judicial review of 
administrative decisions, “the rules governing judicial review have no more 
substance at the core than a seedless grape”); David Zaring, Reasonable Agencies, 
96 VA. L. REV. 135, 138 (2010) (“[C]ourts do not, in the end, discern the differences 
among these various doctrines, frequently do not distinguish among the doctrines 
in application, and probably do not really care which standard of review they 
apply most of the time.”); cf. Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. NLRB, 448 F.2d 1127, 
1142 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (Leventhal, J., dissenting) (prematurely believing that he 
had found the “case dreamed of by law school professors” where the agency's 
findings, though “clearly erroneous,” were “nevertheless” supported by 
“substantial evidence”). Judge Richard Posner is slightly more optimistic, 
suggesting that there are just two standards—“plenary,” and “deferential”—
which are operationally capable of having an impact on the outcome. United 
States v. Boyd, 55 F.3d 239, 242 (7th Cir. 1995). But Judge Posner acknowledges 
the folly of trying to draw any other palpable distinctions. See id. (“We are not 
fetishistic about standards of appellate review. We acknowledge that there are 
more verbal formulas for the scope of appellate review (plenary or de novo, clearly 
erroneous, abuse of discretion, substantial evidence, arbitrary and capricious, 
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reviewed de novo,106 arguing that an agency’s decision to 
bypass notice-and-comment is a failed “observance of 
procedure required by law” under 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(D).107 
Others advocate for the more deferential “arbitrary and 
capricious” standard under 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).108 This Part 
argues that neither is sufficient, since either approach treats 
an agency’s good cause determination as a one-dimensional 
action rather than the multifaceted decision that it is. In 
other words, applying arbitrary and capricious review, on its 
own, to an agency’s decision to use good cause affords 
deference to agencies in areas where it is not due—namely 
legal conclusions—and applying only de novo review 
 
some evidence, reasonable basis, presumed correct, and maybe others) than there 
are distinctions actually capable of being drawn in the practice of appellate 
review.”). This Comment assumes, as one should hope, that the standard of 
review matters.  
 106. See, e.g., Nat. Res. Def. Council v. Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 
894 F.3d 95, 113 (2d Cir. 2018); Sorenson Commc’ns Inc. v. FCC, 755 F.3d 702, 
706 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (calling an agency’s use of good cause a “legal conclusion” 
and thus the standard of review “is de novo”); United States v. Brewer, 766 F.3d 
884, 888 (8th Cir. 2014) (“The Fourth and Sixth Circuits, however, applied de 
novo review.”); United States v. Reynolds, 710 F.3d 498, 507 (3d Cir. 2013) (noting 
that the Fourth and Sixth Circuits applied de novo review without explicitly 
saying so); United States v. Cain, 583 F.3d 408, 434 n.4 (6th Cir. 2009) (Griffin, 
J., dissenting) (“It appears that the majority has reviewed de novo the attorney 
general’s finding of good cause.”); United States v. Gould, 568 F.3d 459, 470 (4th 
Cir. 2009).  
 107. See Reynolds, 710 F.3d at 506 (“De novo review follows from the limited 
scope of review provided to courts in § 706(2)(D) to ensure that agency actions, 
findings, and conclusions are completed in ‘observance of procedure required by 
law,’ which is a legal question for which de novo review would typically be 
utilized.” (citing Marsh v. Or. Nat. Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360, 376–77 (1989))); 
see also COLE, supra note 8, at 13. But see Meister v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 623 F.3d 
363, 370–71 (6th Cir. 2010) (acknowledging that cases brought under 
section 706(2)(D) are reviewed de novo but conceding that the court’s review “as 
a practical matter is often more deferential than that” and that “the arbitrary-
and-capricious standard frequently governs”). 
 108. See United States v. Johnson, 632 F.3d 912, 928 (5th Cir. 2011); United 
States v. Dean, 604 F.3d 1275, 1278 (11th Cir. 2010); see also Brewer, 766 F.3d 
at 888 (“This deferential standard appears similar to the approach taken by the 
Fifth and Eleventh Circuits, which each used an arbitrary-and-capricious 
standard.”); Reynolds, 710 F.3d at 507 (noting “the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits’ 
use of the arbitrary and capricious standard in their SORNA decisions”).  
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withholds deference in areas where the agency should 
receive it—namely factual determinations.109 Accordingly, 
this Part argues for a two-step analysis, where the standard 
of review at step one is “arbitrary and capricious,” and the 
standard at step two is de novo. At least one court and one 
commentator advocate for such a review, calling it the 
“mixed” standard.110  
Section II.A provides an overview of such a standard as 
discussed in the Third Circuit’s decision in Reynolds. Then, 
Section II.B argues that the mixed standard as depicted in 
Reynolds is the correct standard because it is consistent with 
the spirit and the text of the APA,111 better embraces the 
complex and multidimensional nature of agency 
rulemaking,112 and allocates a more accurate amount of 
deference to an agency’s use of the good cause exception. 
Most importantly, this approach will ensure consistency in 
courts’ interpretations of good cause as employed in the APA.  
A. Reynolds’s Middle Ground 
This Comment’s two-step analysis can be traced to the 
Third Circuit’s decision in Reynolds. In that case, the Third 
Circuit noted that the standard of review question “has not 
received in-depth analysis despite the disagreement on the 
ultimate conclusion” and that “only the Fifth and Ninth 
Circuits have directly linked their discussion of the standard 
to § 706.”113 The court proceeded to supply that analysis, 
 
 109. Cf. Virelli, supra note 20, at 724 (rejecting a “one-dimensional” approach 
that treats arbitrary and capricious review as a unitary concept—”as applying 
the same standard in the same way across all manner of agency conduct”—and 
instead arguing that arbitrary and capricious review should divide 
administrative decisions into their constituent parts).  
 110. See Reynolds, 710 F.3d at 509; Golinghorst, supra note 21, at 1300. 
 111. See Reynolds, 710 F.3d at 509. 
 112. Virelli, supra note 20, at 727. 
 113. Reynolds, 710 F.3d at 507. Section 706 of the APA, titled “Scope of 
Review,” enumerates the available standards a reviewing court can use when 
“set[ting] aside agency action.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A)–(F) (2018). 
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stating that the disagreement over the standard of review “is 
heightened by the absence of an expressed standard in many 
non-SORNA114 good cause decisions by courts of appeals.”115 
Instead, these cases were resolved by interpreting the good 
cause exception with a limiting principle, “commonly 
formulated as a direction that ‘good cause’ should be 
‘narrowly construed.’”116 These courts have explained that 
this framework dictates that “circumstances justifying 
reliance on the good cause exception are indeed rare and will 
be accepted only after the court has examined closely 
proffered rationales justifying the elimination of public 
procedures.”117 This regime, the court noted, “has been 
developed separate and apart from § 706, derived from the 
legislative history of the good cause exception.”118 The court 
acknowledged that this principle seems to point towards de 
novo review, but pulled back and stated that “the close 
examination required by de novo review is inconsistent with 
the deference afforded under the arbitrary and capricious 
 
 114. The Reynolds case entered the discussion in the context of the attorney 
general’s retroactive application of the Sex Offender Registration and 
Notification Act (“SORNA”) without notice-and-comment, which is the primary 
stage for the debate over the appropriate standard of review. See generally COLE, 
supra note 8; Golinghorst, supra note 21; Kim, supra note 15.  
 115. Reynolds, 710 F.3d at 507; see also COLE, supra note 8, at 14 
(“Complicating matters, however, is the practice of some courts to not clearly 
adopt either standard, but focus instead on simply ‘narrowly constru[ing]’ the 
provision.” (citing Mid–Tex Elec. Coop. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 822 
F.2d 1123, 1132 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. EPA, 683 F.2d 
752, 764 (3d Cir. 1982))). 
 116. Reynolds, 710 F.3d at 507 (citations omitted); see also California v. Azar, 
911 F.3d 558, 575 (9th Cir. 2019) (not applying a standard of review to the good 
cause exception but declaring that “[g]ood cause is to be ‘narrowly construed and 
only reluctantly countenanced’” (quoting Alcaraz v. Block, 746 F.2d 593, 612 (9th 
Cir. 1984))); see also Lavilla, supra note 34, at 333–34 n.66 (1989) (collecting cases 
applying a narrow construction of the good cause exemption). 
 117. Reynolds, 710 F.3d at 507 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 
Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. EPA, 683 F.2d 752, 764 (3d Cir. 1982)).  
 118. Id. at 508 (citing Am. Iron & Steel Inst. v. EPA, 568 F.2d 284, 291–92 (3d 
Cir. 1977)). 
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standard.”119 Then, citing Philadelphia Citizens in Action v. 
Schweiker,120 a previous Third Circuit decision, the Reynolds 
court suggested that the narrow-construction principle can 
be applied in a way where arbitrary and capricious review 
and de novo review can coexist: by using a “mixed” 
standard.121 
In Schweiker, the Third Circuit reviewed de novo 
whether “shortness of time can []ever constitute good cause 
for invoking the [good cause] exemption.”122 Simultaneously, 
the court applied arbitrary and capricious review to 
determine whether the agency’s claim that alternative 
procedures were impracticable was correct.123 After 
discussing this, the court in Reynolds explained the “mixed” 
standard: 
Schweiker’s bifurcated analysis shows that the narrow-
construction limiting-principle supports the third standard 
available—a mixed standard—consistent with both de novo and 
arbitrary and capricious review. This mixed standard requires that 
we review de novo whether the agency’s asserted reason for waiver 
of notice and comment constitutes good cause, as well as whether 
the established facts reveal justifiable reliance on the reason. But 
any factual determinations made by the agency to support its 
proffered reason are subject to arbitrary and capricious review.124 
 
 119. Id. (citing Nat. Res. Def. Council, 683 F.2d at 760, 764). 
 120. 669 F.2d 877 (3d Cir. 1982). 
 121. Reynolds, 710 F.3d at 508. 
 122. 669 F.2d at 883.  
 123. Id. at 886.  
 124. Reynolds, 710 F.3d at 508. The APA does not explicitly mention the 
standard for reviewing factual determinations in informal proceedings such as 
notice-and-comment rulemaking. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A)–(F) (2018). However, 
the APA provides that factual findings made in formal proceedings are reviewed 
for “substantial evidence.” § 706(2)(E) (requiring a court to set aside agency action 
that is “unsupported by substantial evidence in a case subject to sections 556 and 
557”). Although a similar provision does not exist for informal proceedings, courts 
consider the APA’s arbitrary and capricious standard found in section 706(2)(A) 
to be a “catchall” provision for judicial review of agency actions, including factual 
determinations made in informal rulemaking. See Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. 
Orgs., Inc. v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 745 F.2d 677, 683 (D.C. 
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This analysis, the Reynolds court noted, “is consistent 
with the text of § 706 because it includes no requirement that 
only one provision of the section be applied to a particular 
review” and “allows [courts] to apply one standard to legal 
determinations and another to factual determinations made 
in an administrative decision.”125 The court’s analysis more 
or less ended here, as it ultimately declined to adopt any of 
these standards and resolve the tension, holding that the 
agency’s assertion of good cause failed “even the most 
deferential standard.”126  
 
Cir. 1984) (holding that the scope of review provisions of the APA are 
“cumulative” and that section 706(2)(A)’s arbitrary and capricious provision is a 
“catchall” that “enabl[es] courts to strike down, as arbitrary, agency action that 
is devoid of needed factual support”). The Supreme Court has explained that this 
review requires courts to determine whether the agency’s factual findings are 
supported by “substantial evidence” in light of the “whole record.” Universal 
Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 477 (1951). Under this test, courts 
determine whether the facts are supported by “such relevant evidence as a 
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Id. (quoting 
Consol. Edison Co. v. Labor Bd., 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)). So although judicial 
review of discretionary decisions and factual determinations share the same 
textual footing in the APA, they are reviewed under separate and distinct 
substantive tests. See infra note 135 (discussing hard-look review for 
discretionary decisions). 
 125. Reynolds, 710 F.3d at 509.  
 126. Id. This technique is not uncommon. Because of the confusion 
surrounding the appropriate standard of review, some courts avoid the question 
altogether by finding that the agency’s use of the exception fell even under the 
most deferential option. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. President United States, 930 
F.3d 543, 567 n.22 (3d Cir. 2019) (“Though the review standard for agency 
assertions of good cause remains an open question in our circuit, we need not 
answer that question here. Even applying the most deferential of the potential 
standards—reviewing the agency’s good cause determination to see if it is 
arbitrary and capricious—the IFRs cannot stand.” (citation omitted)); United 
States v. Brewer, 766 F.3d 884, 888 (8th Cir. 2014) (“While we recognize that [the 
circuit split] is unhelpful, we agree with the Third Circuit that the attorney 
general’s assertion of good cause fails under any of the above standards.”); Mack 
Trucks, Inc. v. EPA, 682 F.3d 87, 93 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (“But we need not decide the 
standard of review since, even if we were to review EPA’s assertion of ‘good cause’ 
simply to determine if it is arbitrary or capricious, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), we would 
still find it lacking.”). The reverse is also true. See United States v. Cain, 583 F.3d 
408, 434 n.4 (6th Cir. 2009) (Griffin, J., dissenting) (arguing for arbitrary and 
capricious review but realizing that “under either standard of review, good cause 
has been shown”). This strategy is used outside of the good cause context as well. 
See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631–32 (1996) (declining to adopt a level 
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B. Justifications For the “Mixed” Approach 
This Section aims to pick up where Reynolds left off and 
offer some additional justifications for the bifurcated 
standard. Mainly, a two-step approach is correct because it 
better embraces the multidimensional nature of the good 
cause exception,127 thus allocating a more accurate amount 
of deference to an agency’s use of the exception. When courts 
review an agency’s use of the exception they generally 
examine (1) the agency’s factual findings supporting its 
decision to invoke good cause; and (2) the ultimate conclusion 
that these findings are so compelling as to rise to the level of 
good cause.128 These two components of the good cause 
exception are separate and distinct. As such, they should be 
treated differently and should receive a different amount of 
deference.129 And applying either de novo or arbitrary and 
 
of scrutiny for discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation because the state 
law at issue fell under the most deferential level of scrutiny); Nat. Res. Def. 
Council v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., 421 F.3d 872, 878–89 (9th Cir. 2005) (“We 
need not resolve this question here, because even under the Chevron standard of 
review, the 2002 quota was based on an impermissible construction of the Act.”); 
Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. Wilson N. Jones Mem’l. Hosp., 374 F.3d 362, 369 
(5th Cir. 2004) (“We do not need to decide whether the [agency]’s interpretation 
of annuity starting date warrants Chevron deference because it is clear that the 
[agency]’s order may be upheld as a matter of law under the less deferential 
standard set forth in [Mead].”). 
 127. Cf. Virelli, supra note 20, at 727. 
 128. Cf. Boliek, supra note 27, at 3363. 
 129. Breaking down an agency action into its constituent parts and applying 
different standards to each part is not a new idea. In his article Deconstructing 
Arbitrary and Capricious Review, Professor Louis J. Virelli III developed a 
multifaceted “deconstruction” model which aims to apply varying degrees of 
arbitrary and capricious review to each individual component of an agency’s 
action. The model reveals a subset of discrete inquiries within arbitrary and 
capricious review that courts can use to properly check agency action while 
promoting administrative efficiency and legitimacy. Virelli, supra note 20, at 737. 
In doing so, it distinguishes between “first-order” agency conduct, which includes 
“modes of self-education and information gathering,” and “second-order” agency 
conduct, which includes an agency’s “choice of relevant factors to influence its 
final policy conclusions and the relationship between that conclusion and the 
agency’s supporting rationale.” Id. at 738. Each of these types of agency behavior, 
according to the model, are subject to varying degrees of deference based upon 
their proximity to the ultimate policy choice made by the agency. Id. at 738–39. 
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capricious review by themselves ignores these important 
differences. For instance, underlying any given good cause 
claim are the agency’s factual determinations,130 which 
generally implicate the agency’s expertise and thus should 
receive deference.131 So applying de novo review in a 
blanketed fashion would ignore the case for deference to an 
agency’s factual findings.132 Therefore, it is appropriate that 
the first step in this bifurcated analysis is to apply arbitrary 
and capricious review to the agency’s underlying factual 
determinations.  
Analyzing the second step, the agency’s ultimate 
conclusion that the underlying findings are so compelling as 
to rise to the level of good cause, is less straight forward. This 
is because courts appear to disagree about whether to 
classify good cause as a “legal conclusion” or a “discretionary 
decision.”133 This distinction matters because the amount of 
deference owed to the agency’s ultimate decision to invoke 
good cause depends on this classification.134 If the decision is 
classified as discretionary, then it would seem that arbitrary 
and capricious review should apply through and through, 
that is, to both steps one and two.135 In contrast, those in the 
 
 130.  See Alcaraz v. Block, 746 F.2d 593, 612 (9th Cir. 1984) (“Our inquiry into 
whether the Secretary properly invoked ‘good cause’ proceeds case-by-case, 
sensitive to the totality of the factors at play.”); Vermeule, supra note 11, at 1123 
(“[Good cause] cases are exceedingly factbound.”). 
 131. See Scheduled Airlines Traffic Offices, Inc. v. Dep’t of Def., 87 F.3d 1356, 
1361 (D.C. Cir. 1996). 
 132.  Golinghorst, supra note 21, at 1297. 
 133. See COLE, supra note 8, at 13. 
 134.  Id. at 10 
 135. Judge Leventhal of the D.C. Circuit ultimately coined the term “hard-
look” review to describe the type of review afforded to an agency’s discretionary 
decisions. See Greater Bos. Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 851 (D.C. Cir. 
1970) (stating that an agency decision should be overturned “if the court becomes 
aware, especially from a combination of danger signals, that the agency has not 
really taken a ‘hard look’ at the salient problems, and has not genuinely engaged 
in reasoned decision-making” (footnote omitted)); Harold Levanthal, 
Environmental Decisionmaking and the Role of the Courts, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 509, 
514 (1974) (“The court does not make the ultimate decision, but it insists that the 
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official or agency take a ‘hard look’ at all relevant factors.”). Hard-look review has 
since become synonymous with arbitrary and capricious review. Virelli, supra 
note 20, at 727–28. Under this approach, the reviewing court’s role is “to make 
sure that agency ‘expertise’ does not disguise agency refusal to deal with 
agonizing questions or with cogent opposition to its intended direction.” Patricia 
M. Wald, Judicial Review of Complex Administrative Agency Decisions, 462 
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 72, 77 (1982). So long as the agency has not 
“shirked this fundamental task,” then the court “exercises restraint and affirms 
the agency’s action even though this court would on its own account have made 
different findings . . . .” Greater Bos. Television Corp., 444 F.2d at 851. The 
Supreme Court endorsed this movement towards a new approach to arbitrary 
and capricious review, see Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 
402, 415–17 (1971), then cemented its applicability by famously stating a number 
of factors that courts must consider when reviewing an agency’s action for 
arbitrariness:  
Normally, an agency rule would be arbitrary and capricious if the agency 
has relied on factors which Congress has not intended it to consider, 
entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, offered an 
explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence before the 
agency, or is so implausible that it cannot be ascribed to a difference in 
view or the product of agency expertise. 
Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins., 463 U.S. 29, 43 
(1983). Although normally described as a “doctrine of deference,” Virelli, supra 
note 20, at 761, arbitrary and capricious review under the hard-look approach 
provides meaningful constraint against otherwise unchecked agency discretion, 
a much-needed consolation for the lack of constitutional text supporting the 
administrative state. See Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, The Real World 
of Arbitrariness Review, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 761, 768 (2008) (“[A]rbitrariness 
review can be seen as a response to the uneasy constitutional position of agencies 
wielding broad discretionary power; perhaps such review can reintroduce 
surrogate safeguards for the decline of constitutional checks on agency 
authority.”); Sidney A. Shapiro & Richard E. Levy, Heightened Scrutiny of the 
Fourth Branch: Separation of Powers and the Requirement of Adequate Reasons 
for Agency Decisions, 1987 DUKE L.J. 387, 440 (1987) (“[Hard-look] review 
acknowledges the unique constitutional position of agencies outside the tripartite 
system of government envisioned by the Framers, and compensates through 
heightened scrutiny of agency decisions in the form of the requirement that 
agencies give adequate reasons.”). At the same time, hard-look review limits 
courts in their ability to impermissibly intrude upon institutional values such as 
agency expertise and independence. See State Farm, 463 U.S. at 53 (“[Passing 
upon the generalizability of field studies] is precisely the type of issue which rests 
within the expertise of [the agency], and upon which a reviewing court must be 
most hesitant to intrude.”); SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196 (1947) 
(fearing that reviewing courts, in supplying their own reasons, would tread “into 
the domain which Congress has set aside exclusively for the administrative 
agency”); Emily Hammond Meazell, Presidential Control, Expertise, and the 
Deference Dilemma, 61 DUKE L.J. 1763, 1772 (2012) (“Naturally, expertise also 
figures into judicial review as a reason for deference to agencies.”).  
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de novo camp would say that such action is a “legal 
conclusion,”136 an interpretation of the APA’s text which 
agencies do not have authority to do.137  
An agency’s ultimate decision to invoke good cause after 
relying on its factual findings is a legal conclusion, not a 
discretionary decision.138 The APA is unlike an agency’s 
organic statute where the agency’s expertise can be brought 
to bear on a particular statutory provision.139 Rather, a good 
cause claim is an exercise of “statutory interpretation upon 
which the court is ready and able to substitute its judgment 
for that of the agency” about whether its circumstances rise 
to the level of good cause.140 So although agencies are experts 
 
 136. See, e.g., Sorenson Commc’ns Inc. v. FCC, 755 F.3d 702, 706 (D.C. Cir. 
2014) (“Therefore, our review of the agency’s legal conclusion of good cause is de 
novo.”); Iowa League of Cities v. EPA, 711 F.3d 844, 872 (8th Cir. 2013) (agreeing 
with the Ninth Circuit that the rationale for deferring to an agency action is not 
present where the question is whether the agency has followed the law). 
 137. See, e.g., Sorenson, 755 F.3d at 706 (“[A]n agency has no interpretive 
authority over the APA.”); Reno-Sparks Indian Colony v. EPA, 336 F.3d 899, 910 
n.11 (9th Cir. 2003) (“This Court reviews de novo the agency’s decision not to 
follow the APA’s notice and comment procedures. The agency is not entitled to 
deference because complying with the notice and comment provisions when 
required by the APA ‘is not a matter of agency choice.’” (quoting Sequoia Orange 
Co. v. Yeutter, 973 F.2d 752, 757 n.4 (9th Cir. 1992))); Campanale & Sons v. 
Evans, 311 F.3d 109, 120 n.14 (1st Cir. 2002) (“We are unaware of any line of 
cases that allows an agency to make a binding determination that it has complied 
with specific requirements of the law.”); Envirocare of Utah, Inc. v. Nuclear 
Regulatory Comm’n, 194 F.3d 72, 79 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (“[W]hen it comes to 
statutes administered by several different agencies—statutes, that is, like the 
APA and unlike the standing provision of the Atomic Energy Act—courts do not 
defer to any one agency’s particular interpretation.”); Warden v. Shalala, 149 
F.3d 73, 79 (1st Cir. 1998) (reviewing de novo whether an agency’s rule was 
substantive or interpretive under the APA’s exception for interpretive rules); 
Zaring, supra note 105, at 146 (“De novo review is appropriate when agencies are 
interpreting laws that they do not have a special responsibility to administer, like 
the Constitution, the APA, or Title VII.”). 
 138. The subtle question of whether to classify good cause as a discretionary 
decision or a legal conclusion, and the reasons for doing so, for purposes of the 
standard of review has yet to receive any in-depth treatment. See generally COLE, 
supra note 8; Golinghorst, supra note 21. 
 139. JAMES T. O’REILLY, ADMINISTRATIVE RULEMAKING § 3:14 (2020 ed. 2020). 
 140. Id.; Wells v. Schweiker, 536 F. Supp 1314, 1324 (E.D. La. 1982) (“[T]he 
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in their particular fields,141 “‘good cause’ is a term of art in a 
statute,” and “the courts are equally or more capable than an 
agency is to interpret the APA term ‘good cause’ without 
deference to an agency’s view of the APA.”142 Professor James 
T. O’Reilly’s argument on this topic merits quotation in full: 
On matters of public procedural rights before administrative 
agencies, the courts do not readily defer to agency preferences 
where private persons are affected. Although the federal courts 
might defer to agency choices on an objective definitional question, 
the existence of good cause is a question of statutory interpretation 
 
Secretary argues that his determination that good cause existed to dispense with 
s 553 procedures is to be reviewed only for abuse of discretion. I conclude that I 
am bound by the Fifth Circuit’s approach . . . . [which] subjected the agency’s 
determination of good cause to independent review . . . . This standard of review 
is especially appropriate here, since Mrs. Wells alleges the legal insufficiency of 
the Secretary’s assertion of good cause, an issue of statutory interpretation 
traditionally committed to courts.”); see also, e.g., Mack Trucks, Inc. v. EPA, 682 
F.3d 87, 93 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (giving “no particular deference” to the agency in 
holding that notice-and-comment was not “impracticable” for agency’s rule 
because it did not stave off any imminent threat to the environment or safety or 
national security); id. at 94 (holding that the “unnecessary” prong of the exception 
is confined to those situations in which the administrative rule is a routine 
determination, insignificant in nature and impact, and inconsequential to the 
industry and to the public); Mobil Oil Corp. v. Dep’t of Energy, 610 F.2d 796, 803 
(Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1979) (stating that it is “axiomatic” that a conclusory 
recitation of good cause does not constitute good cause while holding that a desire 
to provide immediate guidance, without more, is insufficient to bypass notice-
and-comment); Nat’l Venture Capital Ass’n v. Duke, 291 F. Supp. 3d 5, 15, 17 
(D.D.C. 2017) (reviewing de novo and holding that alleged expense of 
implementing rule allowing certain foreign entrepreneurs to obtain immigration 
parole did not justify Department of Homeland Security’s failure to comply with 
APA’s notice-and-comment requirements); Hedge v. Lyng, 689 F. Supp. 884, 893 
(D. Minn. 1987) (holding that Secretary of Agriculture’s concern about possible 
disruption of his existing calendar if regulations governing election of FmHA 
county committee members were not expeditiously adopted did not rise to level 
of an “emergency,” such as would constitute good cause). 
 141. Cameron B. Alston, Oregon Natural Resources Council v. United States 
Forest Service, 27 ECOLOGY L.Q. 727, 740–41 (2000).  
 142. O’REILLY, supra note 139; see also Scheduled Airlines Traffic Offices, Inc. 
v. Dep’t of Def., 87 F.3d 1356, 1361 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (“[W]e face a pure question of 
statutory interpretation independent of the complex factual determinations or 
policy judgments particularly within agencies’ expertise. The question under the 
APA is not whether the Department acted arbitrarily or capriciously, as in 
ordinary challenges to procurement decisions, but rather whether it acted in 
accordance with [federal] law.”). 
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first and foremost. Congress did not delegate the express power to 
enforce the APA to any particular agency; good cause definitions 
involve no agency-specific expertise; so under the statute, the 
agency should not expect to be able to interpret good cause without 
justifying it under very careful judicial scrutiny. 
Both the courts’ attentiveness to public participation values, and 
the attentiveness of the courts to legislative history, should warn 
agencies not to adopt rules without spelling out their good cause 
claim in express terms.143  
The view that invoking good cause is a legal conclusion 
would also be well supported by a majority of courts, given 
that de novo review is the majority approach.144 Lastly, 
classifying the decision as such is more consistent with the 
APA’s legislative history, since characterizing the action as 
a discretionary decision could potentially transform the 
exception into an “escape clause,” controverting legislative 
intent.145 Therefore, it makes good sense that the second step 
in this analysis would be for the court, after reviewing the 
agency’s factual findings for arbitrary and capriciousness, to 
apply de novo review to the agency’s ultimate decision to rely 
on those findings in deciding that good cause exists. To help 
guide this part of the analysis, courts should determine 
whether the circumstances before them fit into one of the 
circumscribed categories described in Part I supra.146 
  
 
 143. O’REILLY, supra note 139. 
 144. Kim, supra note 15, at 1077.  
 145. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 10, at 200. 
 146. See supra Part I. 
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III. THE “MIXED” APPROACH IS NOT AN OUTLIER 
Since Reynolds, the mixed standard has received very 
little scholarly support, with only one commentator 
advocating on its behalf.147 A possible reason for this is 
because the Schweiker decision “appears to be an outlier 
from the body of good-cause case-law from [the Third 
Circuit], as well as other courts of appeals.”148 This Part 
argues that the mixed standard that was used in Schweiker, 
as conceptualized thus far in this Comment, is not an 
outlier.149 Specifically, as a practical matter, the D.C. Circuit, 
the Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals,150 and at least 
one Fifth Circuit district court have applied some form of 
mixed review, whether or not they explicitly declared they 
were applying such review.   
For instance, in Sorenson Commissions, Inc. v. Federal 
Communications Commission, the D.C. Circuit examined 
whether the FCC had good cause when it issued several IFRs 
raising standards for telecommunications service 
providers.151 In doing so, the court declared that its “review 
of the agency’s legal conclusion of good cause is de novo.”152 
To give deference, the court noted, “would be to run afoul of 
congressional intent.”153 However, in a footnote the court 
 
 147. See generally Golinghorst, supra note 21; see also Miriam R. Stiefel, 
Comment, Invalid Harms: Improper Use of the Administrative Procedure Act’s 
Good Cause Exemption, 94 WASH. L. REV. 927 (2019) (acknowledging Reynolds’s 
mixed standard). 
 148. United States v. Reynolds, 710 F.3d 498, 508–09 (3d Cir. 2013).  
 149. Cf. COLE, supra note 8, at 14 n.129 (“It is unclear whether other courts 
that apply de novo review to agency good cause determinations would recognize 
[the mixed standard] as distinct.”). 
 150. The Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals was abolished by The Act of 
October 29, 1992, Pub. L. 102-572, 106 Stat. 4506, and both its jurisdiction and 
its pending cases were transferred to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit. 
 151. 755 F.3d 702 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
 152. Id. at 706. 
 153.  Id. 
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stated that it will “defer to [the] agency’s factual findings and 
expert judgments therefrom, unless such findings and 
judgments are arbitrary and capricious.”154 This bifurcated 
analysis is precisely the type of review the Reynolds court 
attributed to the Schweiker decision.155 
Another case is Mobil Oil Corp. v. Department of 
Energy.156 There, the FEA bypassed notice-and-comment in 
issuing a regulatory change in oil price controls.157 The new 
rule clarified an ambiguity in existing regulations that oil 
sellers were taking advantage of to avoid FEA regulations.158 
In upholding the FEA’s decision to invoke good cause, the 
Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals reviewed whether 
there were “compelling circumstances surrounding the 
discriminatory pricing practices cited by the agency.”159 In 
this instance, the court was reviewing whether the agency’s 
anticipated consequences for engaging in notice-and-
comment rose to the level of good cause. Accordingly, the 
court reviewed that determination under a de novo 
standard,160 ultimately finding that “the threat to the public 
would be sufficiently dire for good cause to be found.”161  
The court continued to address “whether, as a matter of 
fact, [the agency’s] finding of good cause is supported by the 
administrative record.”162 Here the court was reviewing 
whether the circumstances the agency claimed to warrant 
good cause had adequate factual support. The court 
 
 154. Id. at n.3. 
 155. See supra note 124 and accompanying text. 
 156. 728 F.2d 1477 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1983). 
 157. Id. at 1482.  
 158. Id.  
 159. See id. at 1491.  
 160. See id. at 1486–87 (“We are free to make an independent determination 
of the legal question as to whether the agency has made a showing of good 
cause.”). 
 161. Id. at 1492. 
 162. Id. 
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acknowledged that “[a]n agency’s procedural compliance 
with statutory norms . . . is subject to close[] scrutiny,” but so 
far as “the requisite procedures involve factual 
determinations, deference is still afforded to agency 
judgments. The ultimate question remains whether or not 
the agency’s action was arbitrary and capricious, that is, 
unreasonable.”163 The court proceeded to analyze the 
evidence and concluded “that the record supports [the 
agency’s] good cause finding.”164 
Finally, a less explicit example is Texas Food Industry 
Ass’n v. United States Department of Agriculture.165 In that 
case, the DOA imposed a new labeling requirement for 
uncooked and partially cooked meat and poultry products 
without notice-and-comment.166 As justification, the DOA 
cited a public health emergency stemming from E. coli 
contamination and continuing instances of undercooked 
hamburgers.167 The court rejected the DOA’s finding of good 
cause, reasoning that the E. coli outbreak was geographically 
isolated and was the result of negligence of fast food 
chains.168 In addition, the court found that the costs of 
compliance with the rule drastically outweighed the benefits 
of issuing the rule immediately.169 In essence, the court just 
did not think the agency’s circumstances were captured by 
the language of the rule, and in order to be faithful to 
Congress’s intent, the court stated:  
The public is served by federal agencies following the guidelines 
that Congress has established. Some federal agencies are given 
extraordinary powers but those powers may not be casually 
exercised. Indeed, those powers are extraordinary primarily 
 
 163. Id. at 1486 (citations omitted).  
 164. Id. at 1493. 
 165. 842 F. Supp. 254 (W.D. Tex. 1993).  
 166. Id. at 256–57.  
 167. Id. at 257.  
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. at 261. 
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because the agencies are only permitted to invoke such powers in 
truly rare and extraordinary circumstances. Such an extraordinary 
circumstance has not been presented in this action.170 
The court did not state the standard of review here, but 
it did make an independent evaluation as to whether good 
cause existed and rejected the use of a “conclusory statement 
that normal procedures were not followed because of . . . ‘good 
cause.’”171 This is consistent with de novo review. But at the 
same time, the court “in no way attempt[ed] to substitute its 
own judgment for the collective wisdom of the USDA . . . 
regarding effective methods and approaches to combat the 
problems of food-borne illnesses.”172 This language has more 
of a deferential posture. 
As these cases show, the Schweiker decision is no outlier. 
Other courts have resolved good cause cases in a way that is 
consistent with both de novo and arbitrary and capricious 
review. Such an approach is “consistent with the text of 
§ 706” since that section “includes no requirement that only 
one provision of the section be applied to a particular review,” 
which enables courts “to apply one standard to legal 
determinations and another to factual determinations made 
in an administrative decision.”173 In addition, this approach 
“embraces the complexity and multidimensional nature of 
administrative policymaking”174 and thus should be 
explicitly adopted by other circuits in order to avoid further 
confusion and uncertainty in this area.  
  
 
 170. Id.  
 171. Id. at 259 (quoting Mobil Oil Corp. v. Dep’t of Energy, 610 F.2d 796, 803 
(Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1975)).  
 172. Id. at 261. 
 173. United States v. Reynolds, 710 F.3d 498, 509 (3d Cir. 2013).  
 174. Virelli, supra note 20, at 727. 
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CONCLUSION 
The good cause exception has been applied inconsistently 
across the federal circuits. Part of this divergence is 
substantive. Courts struggle in identifying precisely what 
circumstances warrant good cause. This is mostly due to the 
vagueness of the statutory language. Because it is unlikely 
that Congress will amend the language any time soon,175 
courts should make their own efforts to limit dispensing with 
public participation in agency rulemaking to just three 
situations: (1) where prior notice would subvert the 
underlying statutory scheme; (2) where Congress intends to 
waive notice-and-comment; and (3) emergencies. In addition, 
federal courts differ on the appropriate standard of review. 
Some review the action de novo, others under the arbitrary 
and capricious standard. Neither is sufficient on its own 
since a one-dimensional approach to the good cause 
exception does not allocate the appropriate amount of 
deference to the agency’s decision to use good cause. Instead, 
courts should use a two-step approach that applies arbitrary 
and capricious review to the agency’s factual determinations 
and de novo review to the agency’s legal conclusion of good 
cause. Such an approach is consistent with the spirit and the 
text of the APA, furthers the purpose of the narrowly-
prescribed good cause exception, and better captures the 
multidimensional nature of administrative rulemaking by 
allocating a more accurate amount of deference to an 
agency’s decision to use good cause. Finally, such an 
approach is not an outlier: other circuits have applied some 
form of mixed review to the agency’s decision to use good 
cause as a practical matter. To avoid further confusion and 
uncertainty in this area, other circuits should explicitly 
adopt the same approach.  
 
 175. See Paynter, supra note 13, at 399 (acknowledging the several failed 
attempts by Congress to amend the exception’s language, making it unlikely that 
the language will be amended now (especially by one of the most divided 
Congresses in recent memory)); Kim, supra note 15, at 1051–52, 1070–73 
(documenting these failed attempts but asking Congress to try again). 
